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Do US Multinationals Differ from Non-US Multinationals 
in Value Creation? 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a sample of domestic and multinational conglomerates from four countries, this 
paper shows that the value impact of corporate diversification is not uniform across countries. 
The evidence shows that smaller countries like Germany, Japan, and the UK have a larger 
proportion of multinational conglomerates because multinational conglomerate diversification 
does not destroy value. These results contradict previous literature, which primarily focuses on 
US firms. In particular, though industrially diversified firms are valued at a discount in the US, 
they are valued at a premium in Germany and when multinational conglomerate diversification is 
taken into account this premium disappears.  These results suggest that the value of corporate 
diversification is related to the size of the country and its institutional framework.   1
Introduction 
The theoretical literature highlights the importance of host-country, home-country, and 
industry effects on the motivation and performance of multinational investment. The empirical 
literature on value creation and foreign direct investment (FDI), however, has either focused on 
US-based multinational enterprises (MNEs), and ignored the industry mix of FDI. Since many 
MNEs are both industrially and internationally diversified, it is important to consider the impact 
of industrial diversification, international diversification, and their interaction.  
Institutional structure and corporate governance vary across MNE host countries. La 
Porta et al (1999) find that the widely held ownership structure of the typical US firm is quite 
uncommon for large corporations outside the US, which have a substantial family or state 
ownership stake. There is also a wide variation in the number of multinationals across countries, 
which suggests that multinationals in different countries do not have the same motives for 
diversification. Consequently, it may not be appropriate to assume that diversification discounts 
observed in the US are also the norm elsewhere. 
This paper examines the link between international diversification or FDI and value 
creation in four of the largest home-countries for multinational investment – Germany, Japan, the 
UK, and the US. The focus here is on the interaction between industrial and international 
diversification and value. While industrial diversification and international diversification have 
been examined separately, the interaction between these forms of diversification has not been 
previously examined in the literature.    2
Several concerns exist with respect to the diversification literature. Recent papers have 
found that conglomerates destroy value.
1 There is conflicting evidence also showing a global 
diversification discount for US multinationals.
2 Further, the literature controls for industry 
effects but ignores country or interaction effects.
3 Much of the diversification literature does not 
examine multinational conglomerates though they are some of the largest firms with substantial 
economic impact and most of the evidence is limited to US firms. 
This paper not only expands the sample beyond US borders but also addresses some of 
the limitations in the literature. The methodology used in this paper controls for both industry 
and country effects separately and together in order to remove any confounding of the two 
effects. This is not possible with the standard Berger and Ofek (1995) methodology.
4 The 
interaction between multinational and industrial diversification is also examined. 
The results support the international business theoretical literature in throwing doubt on 
the applicability of US results to the rest of the world. While US results are consistent with 
previous literature, the impact of industrial, international, and multinational conglomerate 
diversification is not uniform across the four countries in the sample. First, the impact of 
industrial diversification is not negative in all countries, e.g., industrially diversified firms in 
Germany trade at a premium (consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999)). Second, the impact of 
                                                 
1 Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), Lins and Servaes (1999). More recent evidence 
shows that firms choose to diversify across different lines of business and the industrial 
diversification discount disappears when one accounts for this self-selection bias (Campa and 
Kedia (2002)). 
2 Christophe and Pfeiffer (1998), Click and Harrison (2000), and Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) 
3 Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2003), and Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) control for interaction 
effects. They do not control for country or regional effects. These papers are discussed in more 
detail in the literature review. 
4 Data reporting constraints limit the scope of the analysis with the Berger and Ofek 
methodology, i.e., firms do not report sales by product segment in each country of operation. 
Hence it is not possible to construct a benchmark portfolio of firms in the same multiple industry 
segments and country segments as the multinational conglomerate.    3
geographic diversification is not always positive, e.g., German and Japanese firms are negatively 
impacted by international diversification. Third, multinational conglomerates trade at a premium 
in Germany and Japan. The smaller countries in the sample like Germany, Japan, and the UK 
have a much larger proportion of conglomerates (ranging from 42 to 58 percent of the sample) 
compared to the US (29 percent).  
It appears that successful firms in these countries are forced to diversify internationally 
either due to the lack of domestic opportunities for expansion or alternatively to leverage their 
proprietary assets.
5 The evidence in this paper is also consistent with the Hitt, Hoskisson, and 
Kim (1997) argument that experience with product diversification builds managerial capabilities 
that allow effective international management which consequently enables multinationals to 
perform better. Tallman and Li (1996) also suggest that early product diversification focuses on 
highly related product markets so they are able to capture the synergies (Geringer et al (1989), 
Rumelt (1974)) followed by international expansion to exploit economies of scale.  
The paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews some of the prior literature 
on diversification and multinational investment. The next section describes the data. Next, the 
methodology is discussed. Then the paper presents the results and a discussion of the results. The 
final section concludes. 
 
Why do Firms Diversify? A Literature Review  
Theory 
There is a vast literature on the costs and benefits of diversification based on market 
imperfections and transactions cost theory. The arguments about the benefits from diversification 
                                                 
5 Dastidar (2003) finds that firms with an increased probability of diversifying internationally are 
likely to have higher values in Germany and the UK.   4
predict that diversification has a positive impact on firm value. Stulz (1990) argues that 
diversified firms create larger internal capital markets and thereby reduce the underinvestment 
problem suggested by Myers (1977). Diversified firms are also predicted to have greater debt 
capacity than stand-alone firms because their cash flows are imperfectly correlated. Therefore, 
diversified firms  have less incentive to forego positive NPV projects than stand-alone firms. 
Further, diversified firms may have higher values than non-diversified firms due to winner-
picking by headquarters,  i.e., the creation of value by actively reallocating scarce resources 
across projects (Stein (1997)). These arguments apply equally to firms that are diversified across 
product lines and those that are diversified across national borders since they do not distinguish 
between related and unrelated diversification.  
However, diversification also has its disadvantages based on agency cost theory. Jensen 
(1986) argues that excess free cash flow could result in managers undertaking projects that do 
not increase shareholder wealth. Since diversified firms have larger internal capital markets, they 
are also likely to generate more free cash flow than single-segment firms. Further, the internal 
capital markets hypothesis could imply cross-subsidization of poorly performing segments by 
better-performing segments.  Another argument refers to information asymmetries within the 
diversified firm. Since information is more dispersed, this could result in incentive misalignment 
of central and divisional managers, thereby making such firms less profitable than their separate 
lines of business (Berger and Ofek (1995)). The flip side of the winner-picking argument 
mentioned earlier (Stein (1997)) is loser-sticking, i.e., forcing some projects to get lower funding 
than they could obtain as stand-alones
6. Rummelt (1974) suggest that managers operating in an 
unprofitable industry go for product diversification to improve prospects. Part of the search 
                                                 
6 Shin and Stulz (1998) find that investment of smaller divisions is strongly related to cash flows 
of other divisions.   5
process to improve prospects could be to go into unrelated industries (Chang (1992) so firms 
competing in less attractive industries have higher levels of product diversification (Delios and 
Beamish (1999). Again, many of these arguments apply equally to firms that are diversified 
across product lines and those that are diversified across national borders. 
In addition to the above advantages and disadvantages, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have additional benefits and costs originating from their geographic diversification. 
Internationally diversified firms could benefit by internalizing the market for information-based 
assets or proprietary assets (Dunning (1973); Buckley and Casson (1976); Rugman (1981); 
Caves (1971, 1996)). The market for these assets is imperfect in that they are difficult to sell and 
the diversified firm internalizes the market for these assets. Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984) and 
Kogut (1983) suggest that MNCs are able to exploit differences in product and factor markets, 
international taxation, and financial markets which enable them to extract higher rents than those 
achieved by local competitors. These higher rents then allow multinationals to develop the 
proprietary assets (Kobrin (1991)) and innovation (Kotabe (1990)) needed to consolidate their 
competitive advantage. Multinationals must use existing assets but also develop new ones to 
enter into new markets (Hennart and Park (1993)), they can use existing proprietary assets from 
multiple markets to apply to new market (Kogut and Chang (1991), Porter (1985)), all of which 
increases with geographic scope and has become particularly relevant in the 90s (Dunning 
(1998)). Diversifying across borders also decreases the variability or risk of the firms’ revenue 
streams (Hisey and Caves (1985), Kim Hwang, and Burgers (1993)). Some of the costs 
associated with international diversification include significant barriers to coordination across 
countries (Sundaram and Black (1992)), which in turn increase information processing demands.    6
Further, individual investors are able to diversify internationally with the increasing 
integration of international capital markets at a lower cost relative to firms. In the face of such 
capital market integration is corporate diversification relevant?  
Consequently, based on the theoretical arguments mentioned above, it is not clear that 
industrial or international diversification should have a positive or a negative effect on firm 
value. Further, it is also not clear what the interaction effect of industrial and international 
diversification should be for multinational conglomerates. This is primarily an empirical 
question. 
 
Empirical Evidence 
As mentioned in the introduction, there exists substantial evidence on the negative impact 
of industrial diversification on firm value. Firms that diversify across product lines are poor 
performers relative to firms that do not (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Hitt, 
Hosskisson, and Kim (1997)).  
However, many MNCs are both internationally and industrially diversified. The empirical 
evidence on firms that diversify across national borders shows a positive impact (Errunza and 
Senbet (1981, 1984)). They find that the current degree of international involvement (foreign 
income based on sales) is positively related to excess value.
7 Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999) 
                                                 
7 Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984) also find that the relationship between firm value and degree 
of international involvement is stronger during the period with greater restrictions on capital 
flows. This suggests that MNCs also provide a vehicle for international portfolio diversification. 
However, given greater capital market integration over the past decade, this advantage is perhaps 
of lesser importance today as suggested by the results in Dastidar (2003). She finds that 
multinational firms in the U.K. and the US are valued no differently than an international 
benchmark portfolio, implying that multinationals are not worth more than the sum of their parts 
and that investors could replicate the multinational by investing in single-segment firms located 
in the regions where the multinational operates.   7
show that multinational firms suffer less from industrial diversification than domestic firms. 
They suggest that the industrial diversification discount, based on the widely used Berger and 
Ofek (1995) methodology, is overstated when one does not account for geographic 
diversification.
8 Several studies have found a positive relationship between  international 
diversification and profitability (Grant (1987); Grant et al. (1988); Buhner (1987); and Kim et al. 
(1989)). Other studies find that US bidders gain from industrial and international diversification 
by focusing on acquisitions (Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Doukas (1995)). This suggests that 
MNCs are likely to be successful and have higher firm values. Doukas and Lang (2003) find that 
geographic diversification increases shareholder value when firms engage in related international 
greenfield i nvestments. However, recent papers by Christophe and Pfeiffer (1998); Click and 
Harrison (2000); and Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) a find that global diversification reduces 
shareholder value. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) argue that the reason for the mixed results is 
because the relationship is more complex i.e. non-linear. As firms expand more internationally 
the costs begin to outweigh the benefits creating a curved relationship between 
internationalization and firm performance. 
The evidence discussed thus far is mainly for US firms. In the international sphere, Lins 
and Servaes (1999) investigate industrial diversification discounts in Germany, Japan, the UK, 
and the US. They find that Germany has no significant diversification discount but it is measured 
imprecisely because of the small sample. UK has a discount similar to the US and Japan’s 
discount is significantly lower. However, they do not control for geographic diversification.
9 
Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2003) do control for geographic diversification and find no 
                                                 
8 Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1998) do not isolate the impact of multinational conglomerates. 
9 Delios and Beamish (1999) also find an industrial diversification discount in Japan. They do 
not control for geographic diversification.   8
premium or discount in Germany and a discount in Japan, the UK, and the US for industrial 
diversification. They also find a discount in Germany and premium in Japan and the US for 
geographic diversification. They calculate the diversification discount relative to a domestic 
benchmark (controls for industry effects) and an international benchmark (controls for country 
effects). They do not control for interaction effects, which would be particularly relevant for 
multinational conglomerates. This study simultaneously controls for both effects as well as the 
interaction effect.
10  
In summary, the literature provides both positive and negative reasons for industrial and 
geographic diversification and it is an empirical question as to whether the benefits outweigh the 
costs or vice versa. Further, industrial and geographic diversification could have opposing or 
complementary effects for multinational conglomerates. This paper looks at how investors value 
industrial and international diversification and its interaction for a sample of German, Japanese, 
UK, and US firms. 
 
Data  
Data are obtained from the Worldscope database for the period from 1990 to 1998. Since 
data on geographic segments are primarily available from 1990 onwards, this sample period is 
chosen to maximize the number of firms with international data. The sample includes 896 firm 
years in Germany, 7,513 in Japan, 1,325 in the UK, and 6,412 firm years in the US. Accounting 
and market capitalization data are obtained from Datastream.    Firms that are excluded from the 
sample include: firms with two-digit SIC codes between 40 and 49 (utilities) and 60 and 69 
                                                 
10 Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) control for interaction effects but their sample is limited to the 
US.    9
(financial firms) (Source: Worldscope); firms with negative or zero segment sales;
11 firms where 
the sum of the segment sales is less than 90 percent of the total sales reported for the firm; firms 
with total assets less than 100,000, and firms with missing market value data or no match on 
Datastream. The final sample includes 16,146 firm years.  
The sample is then broken down by country and type of diversification (Table 1). Firms 
are considered industrially diversified if they have multiple segment sales at the two-digit SIC 
code level and are considered geographically diversified if they have regional sales in addition to 
domestic sales. The five regions for the sample include: Asia and Pacific Region; Europe; 
NAFTA countries (the US, Canada, and Mexico); the Rest of the World; and domestic sales. 
Firms in the sample could be single-segment firms, geographically diversified firms, industrially 
diversified firms, or both. 
  Internationally Diversified  Not Internationally Diversified 
Industrially Diversified  Multinational Conglomerate 
(1,1) 
Local Conglomerate 
(1,0) 
Not Industrially Diversified  Pure Multinational  
(0,1) 
Single Segment Local Firm 
(0,0) 
 
The usual method adopted by most papers that use the Lang and Stulz (1994) or the 
Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value measure lumps the purely domestic firms with those that 
are single-industry but geographically diversified, and also  combines the sample of the 
conglomerates with the international conglomerate sample. These samples consider industrial 
diversification only and do not take geographic diversification into account. The sub-sample of 
industrially diversified firms (1,0) together with the sub-sample of industrially and 
geographically diversified firms  – multinational conglomerates (1,1) may be considered the 
                                                 
11 Negative sales are usually classified as adjustments, consolidation adjustments, deductions, 
divestments, group services, inter-company eliminations, or taxes.   10
Berger and Ofek (1995) equivalent sample for multi-segment firms. This sample includes all 
industrially diversified firms, some of which could be geographically diversified as well. The 
sub-sample of geographically diversified firms  - multinationals (0,1) together with the sub-
sample of non-diversified firms – purely domestic firms (0,0) may be considered the Berger and 
Ofek (1995) equivalent sample of single-segment firms. This sample includes all firms that are 
not industrially diversified. In this paper, however, each sub-sample is treated separately.
12 
The proportion of firms in each category is not uniform across the five countries in the 
sample. Generally, the single-segment firms form the largest portion of the sample in Japan, the 
UK and the US, but not in Germany (see Table 1, Panel A). Germany and the UK have more 
internationally diversified firms than industrially d iversified firms. It appears that a large 
proportion of the diversified firms in these three countries are multinational conglomerates. A 
possible explanation offered by Caves (1971) and Franko (1976) is that the lack of raw materials 
in the European industrial countries together with their high levels of industrialization resulted in 
many MNCs integrating backward into the acquisition of raw material. Further, the small 
national markets of some European countries also induce foreign direct investment so that firms 
can diversify their risks. Domestic conglomerates dominate the Japanese sample of diversified 
firms. Caves (1996) suggests that the cultural distance of Japan from the Western industrial 
countries and its dependence on foreign technologies provided little incentive for Japanese firms 
to go abroad. Further, the Japanese firms also faced strong political pressure preventing the 
establishment of production facilities outside Japan, all of which could explain the 
preponderance of domestic conglomerates.  
                                                 
12 A similar classification is adopted in Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) and Hitt, Hoskisson, and 
Kim (1997).   11
There is also a difference across countries in the industrial composition of segments, 
according to Panel B. Most firms operate in the manufacturing sector, i.e., with two-digit SIC 
codes between 20 and 39, followed by the services industry. The percentage of firms in the 
manufacturing sector varies from 38 percent in the UK to 63 percent in Germany.  
According to Panel C, firms primarily sell domestically and then to the Rest of the 
World, to Europe, and North America.
13 The total number of segments in each country is much 
larger than the number of firms because a single firm could have multiple segments.  
Table 2 presents the mean and median values of various firm characteristics for several 
sub-samples described earlier – single-segment firms (0,0); geographically diversified firms – 
multinationals (0,1)
14; industrially diversified firms (1,0); and industrially and geographically 
diversified firms  – multinational conglomerates (1,1). Firms that are both multinational and 
conglomerate are generally larger in terms of market capitalization and sales across all countries 
in the sample followed by firms that are just geographically diversified.
15 Firms that are 
multinational have slightly higher Q ratios in the UK and the US. The number of geographic 
segments in Germany and the UK is higher than that in Japan and the US, which is consistent 
with the finding in Table 1, Panel A that there are more internationally diversified firms than 
industrially diversified firms in these countries. 
                                                 
13 Sales by US firms in the North American region are classified as domestic sales. Hence there 
are no geographic segments in the North American region for US firms. 
14 This sub-sample is also examined in Dastidar (2003). The analysis examines pure 
multinationals (0,1) relative to an international benchmark portfolio to determine whether they 
are worth more than the sum of their individual parts or segments. This paper, on the other hand, 
examines these pure multinationals together with multinational conglomerates (1,1) relative to 
their local counterparts. 
15 The Worldscope database mainly reports data on large firms in a particular country. This 
should not matter since MNCs are likely to be much larger than the average firm in order to 
overcome the local advantage of the domestic single-segment firm and the size argument also 
supports the hypothesis that MNCs run through opportunities in the domestic market before 
venturing abroad (Caves (1971, 1996)).   12
 
Methodology  
Firm value is measured as the log of the ratio of market value to sales because it reflects 
the present value of future cash flows and does not require any risk adjustment like stock returns 
and accounting measures (Lang and Stulz (1994)). The measure most commonly used in the 
literature is the Lang and Stulz (1994) or the Berger and Ofek (1995) definition. According to 
Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999), this definition is inaccurate because it fails to distinguish 
industrial from geographic diversification ( e.g., Lins  and Servaes (1999)). Berger and Ofek 
(1995) and Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999) use alternative measures of firm value and find 
that they yield similar results. An alternative measure also used in this paper is Q (see section on 
robustness checks). The tables report the analysis with log of the ratio of market value to sales as 
the dependent variable, since the sample is less restricted due to data constraints.  
The regression methodology used in this paper is similar to the approach adopted in 
Morck and Yeung (1991). Firm value is assumed to vary due to the different industries and 
geographical regions the firm operates in, its level and type of diversification, various control 
variables such as size, leverage, and profit margin, plus an error term.
16 This is also similar to an 
industry or regional fixed effects approach, though each firm could have multiple industry or 
regional fixed effects.  
The dummy variable regression methodology has several advantages. First, it allows both 
industry and country effects to be explicitly taken into account simultaneously (i.e., it is a 
composite measure) whereas the Berger and Ofek (1995) or the Lang and Stulz (1994) excess 
                                                 
16 The methodology may also be considered an adaptation of the dummy variable regression 
described in Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998) without weighted 
least squares or restrictions.    13
value measures examine industrial diversification alone.
17 The Berger and Ofek methodology has 
an  additional drawback for smaller data samples. The number of single-segment firms in a 
particular industry may be too small to obtain an accurate measure of the median imputed value 
for that industry.
18 In contrast, the dummy variable regression methodology uses the entire data 
sample (multi-segment and single-segment firms) to estimate the impact of industrial and 
geographic diversification. 
The entropy measure commonly used in the strategy literature is a sales weighted sum of 
product or geographic segment size. This measure also does not simultaneously control for both 
industry and country effects. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) includes industry dummies as 
controls for industry effects though country or regional effects are not included i.e. the location 
of the firms’ international operations. 
The variables used to capture the impact of diversification are as follows: The impact of 
industrial diversification is measured by the coefficient on an industrial diversification dummy 
that equals one if the firm operates in more than one product segment (ID). Similarly, the impact 
of geographic diversification is measured by a geographic diversification dummy that equals one 
if the firm operates in more than one geographic segment (GD).  An interaction variable captures 
the impact of diversification for multinational conglomerates, i.e., firms that are both industrially 
and geographically diversified.  
                                                 
17 The Berger and Ofek (1995) measure calculates imputed values for the firm based on industrial 
segment data alone. Composite industrial and geographic segment imputed values cannot be 
calculated because firms report sales by industry code and geographic location separately. The 
Berger and Ofek (1995) measure would require sales broken down by industry and then further 
broken down by location. These data are not available. 
18 This is particularly important because most firms are both industrially and geographically 
diversified (see Table 2).   14
The impact of higher levels of industrial diversification is measured by the coefficients 
on an industrial diversification dummy that equals one if the firm operates in two product 
segments (ID2), and an industrial diversification dummy that equals one if the firm operates in 
three or more product segments (ID3+). The impact of higher levels of geographic diversification 
is measured by the coefficients on a geographic diversification dummy that equals one if the firm 
operates in two geographic segments (GD2), and a geographic diversification dummy that equals 
one if the firm operates in three or more geographic segments (GD3+).  
The diversification dummies capture the impact of industrial, geographic, and 
multinational conglomerate diversification after accounting for the impact of the particular 
industry or region the firm operates in. Industry and country dummies (I1 to I87 and C1 to C 5) 
capture the pure industry and country effects. Industry dummy variables are defined for each 
industry based on two-digit SIC codes, which equal one if the firm has sales in that industry (I1 
to I87). Regional dummies are defined for five regions of the world, which equal one if the firm 
has sales in that region (C1 to C5). C1 equals one if the firm has sales in the Australasian region, 
C2 equals one if the firm has sales in the European region, C3 equals one if the firm has sales in 
the North American region, C4 equals one if the firm has sales in the Rest of the World, and C5 
equals one if the firm has domestic sales. 
 
Results  
The multivariate regressions in Tables 3 to 6 use the log of annual market capitalization 
to sales as the dependent variable. This is similar to the Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value 
measure except that the dependent variable does not adjust for industry effects. Instead, all the 
regressions explicitly control for industry effects with industry dummies for each 2-digit SIC   15
code (I1 to I87) as independent variables. The number of industry dummies varies from country to 
country because not all industries are represented in each country. All regressions are pooled 
OLS regressions and the data are panel data with multiple firm years for each firm in the sample. 
 
Impact of Industrial and Geographic Diversification 
In Table 3 the regression measures the effect of product diversification and geographic 
diversification
19 and is of the form: 
MSit = á + â 1IDit + b2GDit + æ1 leverageit + æ 2 sizeit + æ 3 profitit 
+ d1 I1it + d2 I2it+.......... + d87 I87it + eit           (5). 
The multivariate regressions examine the impact of diversification after controlling for 
industry and additional variables that effect firm value such as relative leverage, relative size, 
and relative profit margin.
20 Relative size and leverage are included to control
21 for changes in 
firm value that could be due to changes in capital structure or size of the firm.
22 Leverage also 
controls for the degree of financial slack available or whether the firm is capital constrained. 
                                                 
19 Individual regressions with just product diversification or just geographic diversification were 
examined. These regressions are not reported as the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients for ID and GD do not change relative to those in Table 4. This is because the 
dummies for industrial and geographic diversification are not highly correlated with each other 
across the five countries in the sample. 
20 All relative measures are the actual value minus a sales weighted median industry and regional 
imputed value. Relative size, for example, captures the deviation of the firms’ actual size from 
that of the sales weighted portfolio of single-segment domestic firms. Since MNCs are likely to 
be much larger than the domestic firm, an absolute measure of size would not sufficiently control 
for this effect. Similar relative control variables are used in Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999), 
Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) and Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2003). 
21 Correlations between the explanatory variables are low in general.  
22 All the control variables used in the regression analysis are ratios that are considered to be 
common across countries and hence have maximum comparability across borders, according to 
Datastream.   16
Based on the empirical evidence in the US, one would expect a negative coefficient for 
product or industrial diversification and a positive coefficient for geographic or international 
diversification. As expected industrial diversification has a negative and statistically significant 
impact in Japan and the US, which is consistent with prior empirical evidence (Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997), Delios and Beamish (1999), 
and Lins and Servaes (1999)).
23 The impact is insignificant in the UK,  i.e., there is no 
diversification discount. In Germany, however, industrial diversification increases firm value. 
These results for Germany are consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999). 
Geographic or international diversification has a negative and statistically significant 
impact in Germany and Japan, though it has a positive impact in the US.  The result for the US is 
consistent with that of Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999) and Morck and Yeung (1998). The 
impact of geographic diversification is insignificant in the UK.  
 
Impact of Multinational Conglomerate Diversification 
If product diversification is considered beneficial as in the case of Germany, one would 
expect German firms to be more industrially diversified. Instead they are more internationally 
diversified than firms from other countries in the sample. However, this regression does not 
control for multinational conglomerates, which are all considered to be industrially diversified 
firms. This could have confounding effects on the industrial diversification discount. One could 
also hypothesize from the results of Lins and Servaes (1999) of an insignificant discount in 
Germany that the lack of a discount is perhaps due to the impact of multinational conglomerate 
diversification (Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999)), since Lins and Servaes (1999) do not 
                                                 
23 The signs on the control variables are consistent with previous literature.   17
explicitly take into account the impact of geographic diversification or multinational 
conglomerate diversification. It is possible that the two types of diversification – industrial and 
geographic – counteract each other in Germany. The industrially diversified group (ID equals 
one) as well as the geographically diversified group (GD equals one), both include multinational 
conglomerates. Though the overlap of the two groups does not imply high correlation, this could 
have confounding effects. Hence it is important to take the "interaction effect" into account 
separately. This interaction effect has also not been previously examined for non-US 
multinationals. 
Table 4 specifically accounts for multinational conglomerate diversification in addition to 
industrial and geographic diversification. The coefficient on ID captures the diversification effect 
for firms that are just industrially diversified, the coefficient on GD for firms that are just 
geographically diversified, and the coefficient on ID*GD for firms that are both industrially and 
geographically diversified, i.e., multinational conglomerates. 
MSit = á + â 1IDit + b2GDit +b3ID*GDit + æ1 leverageit + æ 2 sizeit  
+ æ 3 profitit + d1 I1it + d2 I2it+.......... + d87 I87it + eit        (6). 
Multinational conglomerate diversification increases firm value in Germany and Japan. 
The impact is insignificant in the UK and in the US. Previous results for industrial and 
international diversification do not change for Japan, the UK, and the US. The only results that 
do change are in Germany. The inclusion of the multinational conglomerate dummy makes the 
impact of diversification for firms that are just industrially diversified (coefficient on ID) 
insignificant for German firms. This suggests that the positive impact of product diversification 
observed in Table 3 is due to the positive impact of multinational conglomerate diversification in 
Germany.     18
In summary, multinational conglomerates are valued in Germany and Japan. The results 
on industrial diversification for Germany, Japan, and the US are consistent with previous 
literature (Lins and Servaes (1999)). The results on international diversification for the US are 
consistent with Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999) and Morck and Yeung (1998). It appears that 
multinational conglomerate diversification is valued in Germany, though pure international 
diversification is n ot. In Japan, pure industrial and international diversification has a negative 
impact on firm value though multinational conglomerates appear to be able to benefit from the 
synergies from product and international diversification. Pure international diversification has a 
positive impact for US firms. These results are new to the literature. 
 
Impact of Higher Levels of Diversification 
Next the different levels of diversification are examined, as it is possible that the impact 
of diversification on firm value may not be uniform across all levels of industrial and 
international diversification. Lang and Stulz (1994) find that the levels of diversification beyond 
three segments do not matter so firms with two segments and firms with three or more segments 
are examined. The regression in Table 5 examines higher levels of industrial and geographic 
diversification and is of the form: 
MSit = á + â 1ID2it + â 2ID3 + b3GD2it + b4GD3it + b5ID2it*GD2it +b6ID2it*GD3it 
 + b7ID3it*GD2it + b8ID3it*GD3it + æ1 leverageit + æ 2 sizeit  
+ æ 3 profitit + d1 I1it + d2 I2it+.... + d87 I87it + eit          (7). 
This table accounts for higher levels of industrial and geographic diversification for 
diversified firms and for multinational conglomerates.    19
In Germany, the impact of diversification for domestic conglomerates (no discount) and 
pure multinational firms (discount) is consistent with previous tables. Firms with two and more 
geographic segments trade at a significant discount. However, multinational conglomerates that 
are less industrially diversified (i.e., just two industrial segments) and more than two geographic 
segments trade at a large significant premium (ID2*GD3). Multinational conglomerates with 
high levels of both industrial and geographic diversification also trade at a large significant  
premium (ID3*GD3). When one examines product or geographic diversification alone, it 
appears that industrial d iversification is valued positively in Germany. However, it is 
multinational conglomerate diversification that drives the results. So single-segment German 
firms do not benefit from international diversification but multinational conglomerates with high 
levels of international diversification do. 
In Japan, firms with low levels of industrial diversification trade at a discount but not 
those with higher levels of product diversification. The negative impact of geographic 
diversification is primarily driven by firms with more than two international segments. Further, 
the positive impact of multinational conglomerate diversification is driven by firms with low 
levels of industrial diversification, i.e., only two industrial segments (ID2*GD2), but possibly 
more than two international segments (ID2*GD3). 
In the UK, diversification does not matter. This seems surprising in light of previous 
literature. Later, in the section on robustness checks, the results are tested using an alternative 
measure of firm value (Q). Since most of the results in the UK are insignificant, it is possible that 
an alternative measure of firm value may provide deeper insights. 
In the US, domestic conglomerates trade at a discount regardless of the level of industrial 
diversification. The premium for pure multinationals is driven by firms with higher levels of   20
international diversification. As before, there is no premium or discount for multinational 
conglomerates regardless of the level of diversification.  
 
Impact of Regional Sales 
Thus far all the multivariate regressions control for industry effects only. The geographic 
diversification variables do not control for the region of diversification. One could argue that 
sales in certain regions with high information asymmetries could have a negative impact on firm 
value, while sales in other regions could have a positive impact. The overall impact of 
international diversification could wash out due to the opposing effects. Table 6 controls for the 
location of the firm’s sales.  
MSit = b1IDit + b2IDit*GDit + æ1 leverageit + æ 2 sizeit + æ 3 profitit + g1 C1it 
+ g2 C2it+.......... + g5 C5it + d1 I1it + d2 I2it+.......... + d87 I87it + eit      (8). 
The geographic diversification dummy (GD) is dropped from this regression since the 
sum of the location variables add up to one. If the firm is geographically diversified this impact 
is captured by the location variables (C1- C5). The intercept term is also dropped since all firms 
have domestic sales (C5).  
Comparing the results in Table 4 with those in Table 6, the i mpact of industrial 
diversification and multinational conglomerate diversification remains unaffected in all the 
countries except the UK.  After taking into account the impact of regional sales, multinational 
conglomerate diversification has a negative impact on firm value in the UK. This was previously 
insignificant. 
Domestic sales have a large negative impact on firm value in Germany, the UK, and the 
US and an insignificant impact in Japan. In Germany, the negative impact of geographic   21
diversification observed in Table 6 appears to be driven by sales in the Rest of the World 
(primarily emerging markets). In Japan, sales in all regions except Europe have a large negative 
impact on firm value. In the UK, sales in the Australasian region have a positive impact, while 
sales in the rest of Europe has a negative impact. In the US, increased sales in the Australasian 
region and emerging markets imply higher firm values.  
 
Robustness Checks  
As an alternative to the log of annual market capitalization to sales as the dependent 
variable, all the regressions are rerun using Q measured as the ratio of market capitalization plus 
long-term debt plus current liabilities divided by total assets. As compared to the results in Table 
4, the sign and significance of the coefficients do not change in Germany and the US. In the UK, 
the impact of pure geographic diversification, which was previously insignificant, now becomes 
significant and positive. Geographic diversification has a positive impact on firm value (16 
percent) when Q is used as a measure of firm value. Further, the impact of pure industrial 
diversification in Japan is now insignificant.
24 It was previously negative and significant with the 
log of annual market capitalization to sales as the dependent variable. 
 
Discussion  
The results presented in this paper are not consistent across the countries in the sample. 
What causes the impact of diversification to differ across countries? Let us examine them on a 
case-by-case basis.  
                                                 
24 This appears to be due to the impact of leverage in the dependent variable.   22
Product diversification generally implies  a discount which is consistent with prior 
literature. This discount may be explained using agency cost theory which suggests that 
managers with excess free cash flow may forego positive NPV projects and increase 
consumption of perks or build empires. Alternatively, managers could be cross-subsidising 
poorly performing segments. 
However, German firms do not face this product diversification discount, which is also 
consistent with prior literature (Lins and Servaes (1999) and Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo 
(2003)). Krainer (1967), Franko (1976) and Caves (1996) argue that the lack of raw materials in 
the European industrial countries together with their high levels of industrialization led to the 
creation of multinationals that were integrated backward into the acquisition of raw material. 
Further, the small national markets of some European countries offer successful firms limited 
opportunities to diversify risks and therefore induce heavy foreign direct investment (Caves 
(1996)). Recent evidence for US conglomerates indicates that successful firms choose to 
diversify across lines of business (Campa and Kedia (2002)). Extending this argument to 
multinationals, successful firms choose to diversify internationally (Dastidar (2003)) and the 
experience gained with product diversification can build managerial capabilities that allow 
effective management across national borders (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997)). These 
arguments could help to explain why industrial diversification does not have the expected 
negative impact. Successful firms in small countries with limited opportunities for expansion 
choose to diversify across industry lines as well as across national borders. 
So why do Japanese firms face an industrial diversification discount given that Japan is 
also a relatively small country? Lins and Sevaes (1999) provide evidence that firms that belong 
to a keiretsu trade at a discount because the group is a conglomerate and so the firm does not   23
need to be diversified to get the benefits of diversification. The sample in this paper is comprised 
of very large firms which are likely to be part of a keiretsu. This test is beyond the scope of the 
current paper.  
The positive impact of multinational conglomerate diversification in Germany and Japan 
is also consistent with the story that successful firms diversify domestically and internationally 
due to the small size of the local market and not because managers want to build empires. 
Successful conglomerates build managerial capabilities, which are then transferred across 
national borders (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997)). Tallman and Li (1996) suggest that early 
product diversification focuses on highly related product markets so firms are able to capture 
synergies across different lines of business. When firms expand internationally they can also 
exploit economies of scale and scope (Geringer et al (1989), Rumelt (1974)). Global markets 
have intense competition and achieving synergies and economies of scale allow these firms to 
compete effectively (Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie ( 1995)). Multinational firms achieve 
complementarities between different resources across business units that are difficult for 
competitors to imitate (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1991)). The results in this paper 
show that multinational conglomerate diversification does not have a negative impact on firm 
performance and for small countries it positively impacts firm performance. This implies that the 
commonly observed industrial diversification discount is not important for multinational 
conglomerates. 
International diversification has a positive impact on firm value in the US. This is also 
consistent with the previous literature (Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999), Morck and Yeung 
(1991), (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997)).  What is surprising, though, is that international   24
diversification has a negative impact on firm value in Germany
25 and Japan. Sundaram and 
Black (1992) suggest that there are significant barriers to coordination across countries, which in 
turn increase information processing demands associated with language, cultural, political, and 
regulatory differences. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) argue that as firms expand more 
internationally the costs begin to outweigh the benefits creating a curved relationship between 
internationalization and firm performance.  Further, pure international diversification could have 
a negative impact because managers have no experience in managing multiple divisions. 
The results on levels of diversification (Table 5) show that US-based domestic 
conglomerates trade at a discount regardless of the level of diversification. In Japan, however, 
the impact is only observed at lower levels of industrial diversification. The premium for US 
firms with pure international diversification is associated with high levels of international 
diversification only. In Germany and Japan the costs outweigh the benefits of international 
diversification, especially at higher levels of international diversification in Japan.  
Multinational conglomerate diversification positively impacts firm value in Germany and 
Japan - although this positive impact is driven by high levels of international diversification in 
Germany and low levels of industrial diversification in Japan. In the US and the UK, the impact 
of multinational conglomerate diversification is insignificant regardless of the level of 
diversification.  
The results on the location of the firms international operations (Table 6) suggest that 
larger distance has a positive impact on firm value except for emerging markets where the 
information asymmetries could outweigh the benefits of multinational diversification. 
                                                 
25 Since the number of observations for Germany increases substantially from 1997 to 1998, the 
regressions are rerun excluding 1998 data. It does not impact the regression in Table 6 when 
industrial, international, and multinational conglomerate diversification is accounted for. The 
impact of industrial diversification does become insignificant in Table 3.    25
Continuing with the distance argument, it appears that UK multinationals have no added 
advantage from sales closer to home (in the European region). Consistent with the results for 
European firms, it appears that Japanese multinationals also have no added advantage from sales 
closer to home (in the Australasian region). A possible explanation could be that exports are 
perhaps an easier mode of entry into regions closer to home with lower regional trade barriers. 
Consequently, regional subsidiaries are not valued highly. 
 
Conclusion  
This paper shows that the impact of diversification is not consistent across countries. 
Interestingly, industrially diversified firms in Germany do not trade at a discount while 
geographically diversified firms do. However, the industrial diversification premium in Germany 
disappears when one accounts for multinational conglomerate diversification. Multinational 
conglomerates are valued positively in Japan and Germany. The multinational conglomerate 
premium in Germany is driven by higher levels of international diversification while the 
premium in Japan is from lower levels of industrial diversification. Overall the results on 
industrial diversification are consistent with prior literature. The results on geographic 
diversification for the US are also consistent with prior literature.  
The results for Germany and Japan show international diversification can be negative. In 
Germany and Japan it i s for pure multinationals. In Germany the impact of industrial 
diversification is positive for the multinational conglomerates.  
Further, regional sales also impact firm value. International sales in regions closer to 
home reduce firm value (European sales for UK firms and Australasian sales for Japanese firms), 
while sales in some regions further away from the home country increase value. For example,   26
Australasian sales increase firm value for UK and US firms. These results are consistent with the 
argument that distance matters.  
There are several differences in the results across the four countries in the sample. A few 
explanations are proposed but this needs further investigation. A possible hypothesis is that 
differences in the institutional framework across the countries drive the differences in the 
industrial and geographic premium or discount. For example, Lins and Servaes (1999) provide 
evidence that firms with a strong  keiretsu affiliation have greater value loss from industrial 
diversification than  firms without such an affiliation. However, if  keiretsu firms are more 
successful than the average firm, they are more likely to expand abroad and the premium for 
multinational conglomerates in Japan could be associated with keiretsu affiliation.  
Cultural factors could also be another possible reason for the difference in the impact of 
industrial and international diversification. Cultural and political barriers curtailed Japanese 
expansion abroad in the 80s and the 90s, which suggests that many firms had no option but to 
expand domestically across multiple lines of business. As discussed previously in the data 
section, the number of domestic conglomerates in Japan far outnumbers the number of 
internationally diversified firms and the number of multinational conglomerates.    27
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Table 1: Sample Description 
This table describes the distribution of the sample across time, nationality, and industry. All data are from Worldscope. The total number of firm years in the sample 
(16,146) is divided by country and type of diversification. ID is a dummy that equals one for firms that are industrially diversified and zero otherwise. GD is a dummy 
that equals one for firms that are geographically diversified and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms headquartered in Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. Panel 
A provides a breakdown of firms by year and type of diversification. Panel B provides a breakdown by industry. Panel C provides a breakdown by geographic segment. 
The analysis is based on 2-digit SIC codes that are grouped together for presentation. Geographic segments are grouped into five regions (domestic, Australasia, Europe, 
North America, and the rest of the world). The Australasian sample includes domestic single industry firms from Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and 
Singapore; Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK; North 
America includes Canada and the US; and the world includes Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Panel A 
Country  ID,GD  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Total 
Germany  0,0     35      20      16      26      24      25      29      31         51       257  
  0,1     12      18      20      19      18      21      31      25         36       200  
  1,0     10      19      15      14      16      16      23      27         13       153  
  1,1     24      25      24      25      38      36      39      42         33       286  
Subtotal       81      82      75      84      96      98    122    125       133       896  
Japan  0,0   839    368    346    324    310    344    335    325       341    3,532  
  0,1      0       35      42      34      44      46      34      40       156       431  
  1,0     90    400    433    402    401    359    331    338       429    3,183  
  1,1       4      29      32      27      28      22      36      34       155       367  
Subtotal     933    832    853    787    783    771    736    737    1,081    7,513  
UK  0,0     96      41      39      32      30      41      42      58         63       442  
  0,1     29      37      30      28      33      37      43      45         41       323  
  1,0     11      21      18      17      26      21      24      21         24       183  
  1,1     33      68      52      32      30      40      44      48         30       377  
Subtotal     169    167    139    109    119    139    153    172       158    1,325  
US  0,0   597    240    252    264    310    396    438    493       458    3,448  
  0,1     15      78      96      92    142    139    187    218       247    1,214  
  1,0     46    110    111    113    128    151    144    151       152    1,106  
  1,1     24      48      70      77      77      77      77      86       108       644  
Subtotal     682    476    529    546    657    763    846    948       965    6,412        continued  32
 
Table 1 - continued 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by Industry (2-digit SIC code) 
Industry  GE  JP  UK  US 
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing (0-9)       8         32         16         58  
Mining and construction (10-19)     65    1,284       165       631  
Manufacturing (20-39)   562    3,775       510    2,944  
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services (40-48)     93       816       174       680  
Wholesale and retail trade (50-59)     94       876       248    1,089  
Services and Public Administration (70-99)     74       730       212    1,010  
Total   896    7,513    1,325    6,412  
 
 
Panel C: Number of Geographic Segments by Region 
  Australasia  Europe  North America  World  Domestic  Total 
Germany          118            315           198            461            895        1,987  
Japan          195            130           195            690         7,507        8,717  
UK          235            521           456            422         1,298        2,932  
US          481         1,047          0        1,438         6,402        9,368  
Total       1,140         2,275        1,027         3,398       16,817      24,657  
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Table 2: Univariate Statistics 
This table provides univariate firm characteristics averaged over the period from 1990 to 1998. ID is a dummy that equals one for firms that are industrially diversified 
and zero otherwise. GD is a dummy that equals one for firms that are geographically diversified and zero otherwise. Market value and sales figures are in US dollars. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Q is the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt plus current liabilities divided by total assets. All 
of the accounting variables data are from Datastream. The accounting variables are considered to be common across countries and hence have maximum comparability 
across borders according to Datastream. 
 
Country  ID,GD 
Market 
Capitalization  Sales  Leverage  Log(Assets)  Q 
 
Ln(Market 
Cap. / Sales) 
Number of 
Geographic 
Segments 
Number of 
Product 
Segments 
Germany  0,0  331169  753112  0.18  12.80  0.93  -0.71  1.00  1.00 
  0,1  247656  935819  0.22  12.98  0.84  -1.27  3.17  1.00 
  1,0  186557  413313  0.21  12.62  0.94  -0.83  1.00  2.44 
  1,1  779917  1844976  0.21  13.41  0.90  -1.16  3.30  2.69 
Japan  0,0  1591548  1900972  0.27  13.44  1.72  -0.31  1.00  1.00 
  0,1  1702381  3171854  0.32  13.87  1.45  -0.57  2.43  1.00 
  1,0  842658  1353403  0.29  13.36  1.51  -0.52  1.00  2.55 
  1,1  4742151  7651510  0.37  14.81  1.46  -0.59  2.60  2.33 
UK  0,0  1326118  1605851  0.19  12.95  1.48  -0.27  1.00  1.00 
  0,1  1781965  1165486  0.23  12.71  1.67  -0.24  3.13  1.00 
  1,0  1361192  1351788  0.23  12.74  1.42  -0.09  1.00  2.37 
  1,1  3064403  3373944  0.21  13.62  1.46  -0.51  3.40  2.77 
US  0,0  1320164  1688318  0.27  13.01  1.82  -0.42  1.00  1.00 
  0,1  3264977  2529971  0.21  13.39  2.14  -0.07  2.54  1.00 
  1,0  1522930  1749562  0.30  13.46  1.42  -0.51  1.00  2.34 
  1,1  4688054  5016765  0.27  14.17  1.64  -0.34  2.67  2.36 
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Table 3: Effect of Industrial and International Diversification for Firms by Country 
The dependent variable is the log of average annual market capitalization to sales. This is regressed on an industrial 
diversification dummy (ID), which equals one if the firm operates in at least two product segments; an 
international/geographic diversification dummy (GD), which equals one if the firm operates in at least two regions 
(domestic, Australasia, Europe, North America, and/or the rest of the world).; leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets); 
size (log of total assets), and profit margin (profits after tax to total sales). Relative values of the independent variables are 
the difference between the actual value and the sales weighted benchmark values for each segment that the firm operates in. 
Data for the explanatory variables are from Datastream.  The regressions are pooled OLS regressions with p-values in 
parentheses. 
 
  GE  JP  UK  US 
Industrial Diversification (ID)  0.156  -0.061  -0.056  -0.230 
  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.56)  (0.00) 
Geographic Diversification (GD)  -0.252  -0.208  -0.065  0.087 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00) 
Relative Leverage  -0.850  -0.661  -0.982  -1.471 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Relative Size  -0.021  -0.028  -0.014  0.045 
  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.00) 
Relative Profit Margin  0.001  0.068  0.005  0.000 
  (0.81)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-sq  0.28  0.38  0.35  0.32 
N     888    7,511    1,292    6,262  
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Table 4: Interaction of Industrial and International Diversification for Firms by Country 
The dependent variable is the log of average annual market capitalization to sales. This is regressed on an industrial 
diversification dummy (ID), which equals one if the firm operates in at least two product segments; an 
international/geographic diversification dummy (GD), which equals one if the firm operates in at least two regions 
(domestic, Australasia, Europe, North America, and/or the rest of the world); an interaction dummy, which equals one if the 
firm operates in at least two product segments and at least two regions; leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets); size (log 
of total assets), and profit margin (profits after tax to total sales). Relative values of the independent variables are the 
difference between the actual value and the sales weighted benchmark values for each segment that the firm operates in. 
Data for the explanatory variables are from Datastream.  The regressions are pooled OLS regressions with p-values in 
parentheses. 
 
  GE  JP  UK  US 
Industrial Diversification (ID)  -0.087  -0.086  0.037  -0.229 
  (0.49)  (0.01)  (0.75)  (0.00) 
Geographic Diversification (GD)  -0.420  -0.288  -0.005  0.088 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.95)  (0.01) 
Multinational Conglomerates (ID*GD)  0.390  0.182  -0.163  -0.002 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.96) 
Relative Leverage  -0.820  -0.660  -1.006  -1.471 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Relative Size  -0.024  -0.028  -0.013  0.045 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.20)  (0.00) 
Relative Profit Margin  0.001  0.068  0.005  0.000 
  (0.74)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-sq  0.29  0.38  0.35  0.32 
N     888    7,511    1,292    6,262  
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 Table 5: Effect of Type and Level of Diversification for Firms by Country 
The dependent variable is the log of average annual market capitalization to sales. This is regressed on a diversification 
dummy (ID2), which equals one if the firm operates in two product segments; a diversification dummy (ID3+), which 
equals one if the firm operates in more than two product segments; an international/geographic diversification dummy 
(GD2), which equals one if the firm operates in two geographic segments; an international/geographic diversification 
dummy (GD3+), which equals one if the firm operates in more than two geographic segments; leverage (ratio of total debt 
to total assets); size (log of total assets), and profit margin (profits after tax to total sales). Relative values of the 
independent variables are the difference between the actual value and the sales weighted benchmark values for each 
segment that the firm operates in. Data for the explanatory variables are from Datastream. The accounting variables are 
considered to be common across countries and hence have maximum comparability across borders according to 
Datastream. The regressions are pooled OLS regressions with p-values in parentheses. 
 
  GE  JP  UK  US 
ID2  0.093  -0.102  -0.018  -0.265 
  (0.50)  (0.01)  (0.89)  (0.00) 
ID3  0.396  -0.097  -0.046  -0.416 
  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.83)  (0.00) 
GD2  -0.249  -0.070  -0.046  0.039 
  (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.70)  (0.30) 
GD3  -0.443  -0.814  0.004  0.135 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.96)  (0.00) 
ID2*GD2  0.075  0.229  -0.164  0.006 
  (0.67)  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.94) 
ID2*GD3  0.355  0.373  -0.094  -0.008 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.52)  (0.91) 
ID3*GD2  0.188  0.024  -0.195  -0.059 
  (0.43)  (0.82)  (0.36)  (0.65) 
ID3*GD3  0.602  0.124  -0.229  0.028 
  (0.01)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (0.81) 
Relative Leverage  -0.773  -0.654  -1.007  -1.470 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Relative Size  -0.021  -0.029  -0.013  0.045 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.21)  (0.00) 
Relative Profit Margin  0.001  0.068  0.005  0.000 
  (0.72)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-sq  0.30  0.39  0.35  0.32 
N     888    7,511    1,292    6,262  
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Table 6: Effect of Type of Diversification for Firms by Region 
The dependent variable is the log of average annual market capitalization to sales. This is regressed on an industrial 
diversification dummy (ID), which equals one if the firm operates in at least two product segments; an 
international/geographic diversification dummy (GD), which equals one  if the firm operates in at least two regions 
(domestic, Australasia, Europe, North America, and/or the rest of the world); an interaction dummy, which equals one if the 
firm operates in at least two product segments and at least two regions; leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets); size (log 
of total assets), and profit margin (profits after tax to total sales). Relative values of the independent variables are the 
difference between the actual value and the sales weighted benchmark values for each segment that the firm operates in. 
Data for the explanatory variables are from Datastream.  The regressions are pooled OLS regressions with p-values in 
parentheses. 
 
  GE  JP  UK  US 
Industrial Diversification (ID)  -0.061  -0.095  0.043  -0.211 
  (0.62)  (0.01)  (0.70)  (0.00) 
Multinational Conglomerates (ID*GD)  0.343  0.231  -0.215  -0.016 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.77) 
Relative Leverage  -0.824  -0.650  -1.007  -1.463 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Relative Size  -0.021  -0.030  -0.005  0.040 
  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.63)  (0.00) 
Relative Profit Margin  0.001  0.068  0.005  0.000 
  (0.70)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
Australasia  -0.003  -0.572  0.209  0.101 
  (0.98)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Europe  -0.131  0.039  -0.140  0.011 
  (0.15)  (0.63)  (0.04)  (0.76) 
North America  0.127  -0.418  0.101   
  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.19)   
Rest of the World  -0.350  -0.092  0.024  0.089 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.71)  (0.01) 
Domestic  -0.675  0.017  -0.326  -0.594 
  (0.00)  (0.81)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-sq  0.65  0.51  0.40  0.39 
N     888    7,511    1,292    6,262  
 